

### 11.8 Study questions

1. What is nonconsequentialism? Do all nonconsequentialists believe in exceptionless duties?
2. What is a “prima facie” duty? Why did Ima Rossian think promise-keeping is a prima facie duty, and not exceptionless? (11.1)
3. Why did Ima reject the utilitarian approach to promises?
4. On Ima’s view, what is intrinsically good? (11.2)
5. On Ross’s view, what are our basic duties? What should we do when our duties conflict?
6. Explain Ross’s intuitionism method. Did Ima accept this?
7. Explain the claim that nonmaleficence is stronger than beneficence.
8. Explain the claim that many of our duties are relational.
9. Does Ross’s approach give us a definite answer to most moral questions? Give an example where it wouldn’t.
10. Write about a page sketching your initial reaction to Ross’s prima facie view. Does it seem plausible to you? What do you like and dislike about it? Can you think of any way to show that it’s false?
11. What are the three objections to exceptionless norms? How could these be answered? (11.3)
12. What principle is suggested about how strictly to take a norm?
13. What is a right? Distinguish legal from human rights. (11.4)
14. Distinguish between negative rights and positive rights—and give an example of each.
15. Explain libertarian capitalism and extreme socialism. What do they say about positive rights and the role of government? What would a mixed view say?
16. What is utilitarianism’s approach to distributive justice? Explain how diminishing marginal utility tends to favor equality. (11.5)
17. Explain how Rawls proposes to pick principles of justice. What is his difference principle?
18. What is the entitlement view of Robert Nozick? What is the golden rule argument for criticizing this approach?
19. How does our list of philosophical duties differ from the duties listed in the ten commandments? (11.6)

### 11.9 For further study

To solidify your understanding, do the EthCola exercise (see Preface) for “Ethics II—Nonconsequentialism.”

Ross’s view is in Chapter 2 of his *The Right and the Good*. Kant’s *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* is the classic defense of an exceptionless nonconsequentialism. For more on human rights and distributive justice, see the United Nations “Declaration of Human Rights,” Marx and Engels’s *The Communist Manifesto*, Rawls’s *A Theory of Justice*, Nozick’s *Anarchy, State and Utopia* (especially Chapter 7), and Rand’s *The Virtue of Selfishness*. The ten commandments are in

## 12 Virtue

A **virtue** is a good habit. To influence our lives in a deeper way, norms need to be internalized into our character. For example, the golden rule needs to be so much a part of us that we follow it instinctively, as if it were part of our nature. A good person is a person of excellent character traits, a person of virtue.

Virtue played a central role in ancient Greek ethics and has made a comeback in the “virtue ethics” movement. We’ll start by looking at what the ancient Greeks had to say. Then we’ll connect virtue to further controversies, especially those featured in previous chapters.

### 12.1 Socrates and Plato

Socrates (c. 470–399 BC) began ancient Greek ethics by asking questions like “What is virtue?” and “What is justice?” His dialogue partner answers, for example, “Virtue is what God desires” (see Section 3.4). Socrates asks further questions, and the partner responds; there are clarifications, objections, and inferences. While he claimed to teach no ethical doctrine, Socrates taught the life of reason. He taught people to think carefully about ethical questions and to search for beliefs that could be held consistently after thorough examination.

Socrates was sentenced to death because his questioning was thought to “corrupt the youth.” He contended that it was better to do the right thing and obey God than to obey man. So in his death too, Socrates taught people to seek virtue and wisdom above self-interest.

Plato (c. 428–347 BC), Socrates’s star pupil, had an ethical doctrine. For Plato, ethics is like geometry. In geometry, we use our minds to grasp pure ideas, like the idea of a perfect circle, which is the model of the imperfect circles of the material world. So too in ethics, we use our minds to grasp the idea of the Good, which is an objective pattern of perfection that provides the basis for ethics. Like the later intuitionists (see Chapter 4), Plato thinks the norm of right and wrong is within us; things are good insofar as they follow the objective pattern of Good that our minds grasp. And if we know the Good, then we’ll be virtuous and act rightly.

In Plato’s philosophy, the lower must depend on the higher. The human has two parts, body and soul, with the soul being higher. So the soul needs to control the body. Now the soul itself has three parts. The highest part is thought (reason), the lowest is appetites (impulses and desires). The middle

Accordingly, there are four main virtues: one for each part of the soul and one for the three parts working together:

- **Wisdom** is excellence in thinking.
- **Self-control (temperance)** is the rational control of our appetites (impulses and desires).
- **Courage** is the rational control of our “spirited” part (emotions, especially fear).
- **Justice** is the correct ordering of the parts of the soul, whereby the rational part guides the spirited part, and both together guide the appetites.

Thus the good life is a harmony; the higher rules the lower, with reason and the idea of the Good regulating desires and emotions. The life of virtue aims at the health of our souls; it doesn’t selfishly pursue our own pleasure (which is lower). But the good life is the most pleasant life; a selfish pursuit of pleasure hurts us by disorienting our souls.

Plato’s emphasis on controlling our emotions reminds me of the *Rocky I* movie. Here Rocky Balboa, the boxing champion of the world, gives this (slightly edited) advice to a younger boxer:

Your best friend is a guy named Franky Fear. Fear is a fighter’s best friend. It ain’t nothing to be ashamed of. Fear keeps you sharp, it keeps you awake. But you gotta learn how to control it. Fear is fire, burning deep inside. If you control it, it’s gonna make you hot. But if it controls you, it’s gonna burn you up.

These days we hear much about how our basic impulses (about food, sex, violence, fear, and so forth) evolved when we were struggling for survival in the jungle. Take the example of eating. In the jungle, where food was scarce, it made sense to eat whatever we could and whenever we could; and so our genes are programmed to make us want to do this. But life today is different: food is plentiful, attractive, and almost always available. Following our innate urges about eating can lead to ruin. And so eating and other impulses need to be controlled by reason. Learning self-control is a large part of learning how to live properly.

St. Augustine (354–430) Christianized Plato’s approach. Augustine sees life as a journey toward God, who is our supreme good. He sums up his ethics as “Love, and do as you will”; central are love of God, in which our ultimate happiness consists, and love of neighbor for the sake of God. Evildoing comes from disordered desire, when we submit to lower impulses; the correct order is for the soul to rule the body, reason to rule the soul, and the unchangeable Good (God and his law) to rule reason. Augustine accepts Plato’s four natural virtues, which came to be called the four **cardinal virtues**. Christianity adds three **theological virtues**:

- **Faith** is believing in God and what he revealed.
- **Hope** is emotionally trusting in God and his promises.
- **Love** is unselfishly striving to serve God and to do good and not harm to his creatures.

The greatest virtue is love; the greatest vices are selfishness and hatred.

Plato thinks human society mirrors the structure of the soul. He divides people into three classes, depending on which part of the soul predominates. The ruling class, which should guide society, is strong in thought and reason. The working class, which needs self-control, is strong in appetites and impulses. The warrior class, which needs courage and honor, is strong in spirit. In a just society, each class plays its own special role. This rigid class structure is for modern readers a less attractive part of Plato’s ethics.

## 12.2 Aristotle

Aristotle (384–322 BC), Plato’s star pupil, developed the ethics of virtue further. Aristotle makes three structural changes in our understanding of virtue and he puts virtue into a different wider context.

First, Aristotle studies many virtues in detail and puts them into two main groups. Since reason has two main uses, to think and to act, there are two sorts of excellence that we should pursue:

- *Intellectual virtues* (about thinking) include examples like philosophical wisdom, intuition, scientific knowledge, and practical wisdom (knowing how to live).
- *Moral virtues* (about acting) include examples like justice, self-control, courage, generosity, friendliness, and wittiness.

Gone is Plato’s distinction between our appetites and our “spirited” part.

Second, **justice** for Aristotle has to do with treating others fairly. Distributive justice deals with the distribution by merit of things like wealth and honors; corrective justice (including what we call “criminal justice”) deals with punishments. What is just is determined partly by nature and partly by convention: while it’s by nature just that criminals be punished, the civil law determines which punishment goes with which crime. Gone is Plato’s peculiar sense of “justice” as a harmony between the parts of the soul.

Third, virtues are a **golden mean** of “just enough,” between twin vices of “too much” and “too little.” To be *courageous*, for example, is to have just the right amount of fear in a given situation. It’s a vice to have too much fear: you’re *cowardly* if you ski only on the safe bunny slope. But it’s also a vice to have too little fear: you’re *foolhardy* if after one lesson you try to ski the double-diamond expert slope. So the virtue of courage is midway between the vices of cowardice and foolhardiness. It’s important that we face the challenges of life (including courses, jobs, and relationships) with proper courage.

The golden-mean point depends on the person and situation. We

too much for you to eat may be too little for Milo (a famous wrestler in Aristotle's time). The golden mean is determined by a person of practical wisdom who knows about the case.

Aristotle sees that not every mean between extremes is a virtue. It isn't a virtue to be unjust or cruel to the right amount, neither too much nor too little. Instead, *any* amount of injustice or cruelty is a vice. But still, virtues are a mean between extremes. To be properly *witty*, for example, demands that we neither joke about everything (being "too witty") nor joke about nothing (being "not witty enough"). And being properly *friendly* demands that we neither go around hugging every stranger (being "too friendly") nor be impersonal to friends and family (being "too little friendly"). We need balance.

I find Aristotle's "golden mean" to be a useful analytical tool. I once wrote a short article on the virtue of forgiveness. I started by saying that to be *forgiving* is to give up angry feelings of resentment toward one who treated us wrongly. I contrasted this with the vice of *vengefulness*, which is to harbor resentment. I added that vengefulness can lead to "getting even," to endless feuds, and to harm both for the vengeful person (who lives with anger) and for those who suffer retaliation.

But then, thinking of Aristotle, I asked, "Can we be *too* forgiving?" After reflection, I decided that this is the vice of *moral passivity* (having too little resentment toward those who wrong us). I imagined a wife who is regularly beaten by her husband but does nothing, suffering in a passive way, forgiving excessively, and avoiding anger. I thought how moral passivity harms both victims (who suffer) and oppressors (who need to be confronted about their wrongdoing). I concluded that the virtue of *proper forgiveness* (to have the right degree of resentment but be ready to give this up when appropriate) is midway between the vices of *moral passivity* and *vengefulness*. Aristotle would have been proud of me.

So, unlike Plato, Aristotle divides virtues into intellectual and moral ones, sees justice as about our fair treatment of others, and sees virtue as a mean between extremes. He also puts virtue into a different wider context.

Plato, you recall, thinks ethics is like geometry; both depend on ideas that the mind can reach by pure thinking. Aristotle, by contrast, thinks ethics is more like biology. We can examine animals and their behavior, and see why they do things. Similarly, we can examine humans and their behavior, and see why *we* do things. Ethics does the latter.

Aristotle begins his *Nicomachean Ethics* with this observation (slightly edited): "Every action aims at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim." So humans act for goals. These goals form a hierarchy: you do A to bring about B, you bring about B to bring about C, and so on. But we can't go on forever; there must be an ultimate goal for which we act. Aristotle assumes (rightly or wrongly) that we all act for the same ultimate goal, which he calls "happiness."

But what is this "happiness"—this ultimate goal of all our actions? Aristotle argues that it isn't pleasure or honor; instead it's a life where we excellently exercise our highest and distinctive capacity, our function or purpose, which is

called "virtue." So happiness is a life of virtue. Aristotle thinks that the highest form of the good life is contemplation, which is the activity of our highest faculty (knowledge) toward the highest objects (necessary truths); but he admits that this is too elevated for most people. For most of us, the good and happy life is to live according to both the moral and the intellectual virtues. This brings pleasure, but pleasure isn't what we aim at; instead, we aim to be good people, people of virtue.

Some object that this scheme sounds too good to be true. Do we all have virtue as our ultimate goal? When a thief does A in order to bring about B, brings about B in order to bring about C, and so on—is his ultimate goal here to bring about a life of virtue? Presumably not. Or maybe Aristotle is just claiming that a life of virtue is what we *ought* to have as the ultimate object of our desire, perhaps because we intuit its goodness (*a la* Plato) or perhaps because we'll otherwise be frustrated.

St. Thomas Aquinas (1224–74) Christianized Aristotle's view. Aquinas's ethics has two levels: a natural level (from Aristotle) and a supernatural level (from the Bible). With Aristotle, he accepts the natural virtues and the natural happiness that they promote. But he argues from the Bible for a greater supernatural happiness, which consists in the contemplation of God in the afterlife. This supernatural happiness is the activity of our highest faculty (knowledge) toward the highest object (God); it will bring ultimate fulfillment and is (or ought to be) the highest end of all our actions. To orient ourselves toward this ultimate happiness, we need the three theological virtues: faith, hope, and (especially) love. What makes any action bad is that it moves us away from our ultimate goal, which is complete happiness in God. (We'll see more of Aquinas in the next chapter.)

Another medieval contribution was the **seven deadly sins** (the worst vices): pride, greed, lust, wrath, gluttony, envy, and sloth. If we add the corresponding virtues and the opposite vices (following Aristotle's golden-mean method), we get this:

- **Pride** is an inflated, self-centered view of yourself. *Self-understanding* is a correct appraisal of your strong and weak points. *Low self-esteem* is an excessively negative view of yourself.
- **Greed** is an excessive desire for money and possessions. The corresponding virtue is to put money and possessions in their proper place, as important but outranked by some other goods (such as family and relationships). The opposite vice is to have too little concern for money and possessions (for example, you collect unemployment insurance instead of seeking work to better support yourself and your family).
- **Lust** is excessive sexual desire that's out of control. *Chastity* is a proper use of sex. *Prudishness* is negativity to all sex.
- **Wrath** is a vengeful and hateful anger toward one who has wronged you. *Proper forgiveness* is to have a proper degree of resentment but

be ready to give this up when appropriate. *Moral passivity* is to have too little resentment toward those who wrong you.

- **Gluttony** is overindulgence in food. *Self-control in eating* is to eat in a moderate and healthy manner. *Anorexia* is undereating, often based on the mistaken view that you are too fat.
- **Envy** is discontent over another's good fortune. The corresponding virtue is to rejoice in the good fortune of others (and not to see this good fortune as detracting from yourself). The opposite vice is not to care, positively or negatively, about what happens to others.
- **Sloth** is laziness, an excessive aversion to work. *Having a proper work ethic* is to work in a proper way. *Being a workaholic* is to work excessively, at the expense of life's other goods (such as family and relationships).

Other important virtues include patience, honesty, mercy, peacefulness, generosity, cooperativeness, carefulness, compassion, non-discrimination, kindness, and so on. There are many, many virtues that are important to the moral life—many more than can be mentioned here.

Let me add two further ideas from Aristotle. First, we aren't born with the virtues; instead, virtues come with practice. If we want to be generous, for example, we need to push ourselves to do things for others; in time, generosity will become part of our lives. Those who say "I'm not a generous person—that's just not the way I'm built" are avoiding responsibility. To a great extent, we can become the kind of persons that we want to be.

Second, to be virtuous isn't just to act in a certain way; it also involves acting for the right reasons and with the right feelings, as a person of virtue would act. If we speak honestly just because we fear getting caught in a lie, then we don't adequately have the virtue of honesty.

Let me sum up. For Aristotle, virtue is rational moderation. Socrates began Greek ethics by asking "What is virtue?" Aristotle's answer (in Section 6 of Book II of his *Nicomachean Ethics*) goes: "Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it."

### 12.3 Virtue and Imas

Previous chapters discussed views about the nature and methodology of moral judgments (metaethics) and the principles that we ought to live by (normative ethics). To explore how virtue connects to these, I'll now bring back the Imas. Ima Relativist will start the discussion.

Ima Relativist: "Good is what is socially approved in a given culture. Since virtues are good habits, it follows that virtues are habits that a given culture approves of."

"The class of virtues is not exhausted by virtues right before a course in

Aristotle tells us about the virtues of upper-class males in ancient Athens. Lacking are virtues that appear in the Christian era, like humility, concern for others, and love of enemies. Lacking also are virtues that we prize today, like non-discrimination against those who are different from us. Aristotle often mentions slavery but never condemns it as a vice. He often mentions women but never considers that they too might have virtues; I fear that he'd have considered quiet obedience and submissiveness to be their chief virtues. In short, his virtues differ somewhat from ours. I mention this not to condemn him but to emphasize that every set of virtues is relative to culture.

"Imagine the virtues accepted in Nazi Germany. Patriotism to the state and loyalty to one's racial group were emphasized, along with opposition to those (like Jews) who were considered enemies of the state and the people. It was a vice to be nice to Jews and treat them as equals; it was virtuous to overcome personal squeamishness and put Jews in concentration camps. We were brought up to abhor these Nazi virtues. But we have no argument to show that our virtues are objectively superior. Indeed, there are no objective standards about virtues; what we call virtues are just those character traits that our society approves of."

Ima Subjectivist: "Ima Relativist makes good points against the supposed objectivity of virtues. But I contend that virtues are relative not to culture, but to the individual. So I'd be surprised if Aristotle simply parroted the ideas about virtue current in his own time, without adding an occasional disagreement. When I call a character trait 'virtuous,' I'm saying that I like or approve of it—not that my culture does. If I lived in Nazi Germany, I could consistently reject their virtues. I could say, 'This kind of patriotism is socially accepted—but I call it a vice because I abhor it.' My value judgments are about how I feel. David Hume expressed this well (Book III, Part I, Section I of his *A Treatise of Human Nature*, 1739): 'When you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it.'"

Ima Emotivist: "I basically agree with Ima Subjectivist. You have to go with your feelings when you pick virtues and vices."

Ima Idealist: "I disagree with all three of you, since you make ethics irrational. With Aristotle, I contend that *practical reason* determines which character traits are correctly called virtues. I contend that a moral judgment is a statement about what we'd feel if we were *rational*—where being rational involves things like being informed, impartial, and consistent. I argued previously that Nazi values were based on factual errors, ignorance, and extreme violations of impartial concern for everyone. Nazi 'virtues' are wrong because we'd reject them if we were rational."

Ima Supernaturalist: "I like what Ima Idealist says, except that I have doubts about making humans, instead of God, the norm of rationality. Instead, I say that character traits are virtues if God approves of them and vices if God disapproves. And I'd argue that Nazi 'virtues' go against the supreme virtue of universal love that God has revealed."

Ima Intuitionist: "I like the appeal to objective standards, but I don't want to

- To be **impartial** is to make similar evaluations about similar actions, regardless of the individuals involved.

The two ways to express the view (as consistency norms and as good character traits, go) together nicely. Chapter 7 often switches between the two; for example, it sometimes talks about impartiality as a norm and sometimes talks about impartial people.

Chapter 8 presented the golden rule as a consistency norm:

<p>GR Theorem:</p> <p>Treat others only as you consent to being treated in the same situation.</p>	<p>GR forbids this combination:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• I do something to another.</li> <li>• I'm unwilling that this be done to me in the same situation.</li> </ul>
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In Section 8.1, we derived GR from the virtues of conscientiousness and impartiality. We argued that anyone with these two virtues would follow GR—or, equivalently, that those who violate GR must violate one of these virtues. Habitual GR violators are often criticized using vice terms like “inconsiderate” or “thoughtless”; we also call such people “jerks.”

What should we call the GR character trait (to habitually treat others only as we consent to being treated in the same situation)? The world-religions expert Karen Armstrong (2009: 370–1) suggests the term *compassion*, which she understands in the root sense of “the ability to *feel with* the other” (com-passion = feeling with), and not in the narrower sense of *pity* (to feel sad over another’s suffering). Or we could use *consideration for others*, *empathy*, *benevolence*, *kindness*, *fairness*, or *reciprocity*. Or we could invent a term, perhaps *goldenness*. Aristotle complained that Greek often lacks precise words for important virtues; English has the same problem here. Perhaps Chinese can do better; Confucius used 恕 (*shu*) for the golden-rule virtue.

Chapter 9 begins in virtue mode and talks about good character traits:

*Moral Rationality:*

We’re rational in our moral judgments to the extent that we’re consistent, informed, imaginative, and a few more things.

If we put this into Aristotle’s vocabulary, it would say:

*Practical Wisdom:*

We’re wise about how to live to the extent that we’re consistent, informed, imaginative, and a few more things.

If we put this into norm mode, we’d present, as crucial for forming moral judgments, norms like “Be consistent,” “Be informed (get your facts straight),” and “Be imaginative (develop and exercise a vivid awareness of what it’s like to be in the place of the other person).”

Chapter 9 returns to norm mode when discussing moral education. It gives six key commandments of rational moral thinking:

1. Make informed decisions.
2. Be consistent in your beliefs.
3. Live in harmony with your moral beliefs.
4. Make similar evaluations about similar actions.
5. Put yourself in the other person’s place.
6. Treat others as you want to be treated.

To teach these is to teach six key character traits that are important for practical wisdom: being informed, consistent, conscientious, impartial, imaginative, and considerate of others.

### 12.5 Virtue and duty

How does virtue relate to duty (ought)? Is one primary and one derivative? Do we need both?

There are two extreme views. An extreme **ethics of duty** would say that “ought” is primary, virtue is derivative, and we could without loss dispense with talking about virtue. A *virtuous* person can be defined as one who has internalized the correct principles about how one ought to live. So to have the *virtue of gratitude* is just to have internalized the norm that we ought to return good to those who have done good to us. So to talk about “virtue” adds nothing to our understanding of ethics.

An opposing extreme **ethics of virtue** would say that “virtue” is primary, duty is derivative, and we could without loss dispense with talking about duty. We can define “ought” in terms of “virtuous”: how one *ought* to act can be defined as how a virtuous person would act, when correctly understanding the situation and acting in character. So we can do ethics using only virtue notions; to talk about “ought” adds nothing to our understanding of ethics.

Following Aristotle’s idea that virtue is a mean between extremes, I see the truth as somewhere in the middle. Duty and virtue are interdefinable; neither is more basic. Instead, both are different sides of the same moral coin. Views like cultural relativism and utilitarianism can be expressed in terms of either *norms of right action* or *good character traits*. Yet there’s an added richness in bringing both duty and virtue into ethical discussions, as did all the great moral philosophers from the time of Plato and Aristotle. It’s often helpful to look at the same terrain from different but complementary viewpoints.

## 12.6 Chapter summary

A virtue is a good habit. Moral philosophy started in ancient Greece when Socrates asked questions about virtue and encouraged people to think about such questions in a rational way.

For Plato, who was Socrates's star pupil, the lower must depend on the higher. And so our soul needs to control the body, and our soul in turn needs to be guided by the Good, which is an objective pattern that our minds can grasp. There are four main virtues: wisdom, self-control, courage, and justice. St. Augustine and other Christian thinkers accepted this but added three theological virtues: faith, hope, and love.

Aristotle discussed many virtues, but divided them into two main groups: intellectual virtues and moral virtues. Virtue is a mean between extremes; so courage, for example, is midway between cowardice (having too much fear) and foolhardiness (having too little fear). We need practical wisdom to pick the virtues and determine the mean. Virtues aim at happiness, which is the ultimate goal of our actions.

Virtue raises many controversial issues. For example, cultural relativists see each culture as having its own "socially approved habits," or virtues; there's no objective way to call the virtues of one culture better than the virtues of another culture. Classical utilitarians, by contrast, see virtues as habits that promote the general good, seen in terms of pleasure and pain; the supreme virtue is the character trait to do the individual action that we think has the best total consequences.

The golden-rule consistency view, expressed in virtue terms, would talk about character traits like consistency, conscientiousness, and impartiality. Corresponding to the golden rule would be the character trait, perhaps to be called "compassion" or "consideration for others," that we have when we habitually treat others only as we consent to being treated in the same situation. To apply the golden rule, it's important to have character traits like being informed and being imaginative.

Finally, there are questions about whether duty or virtue is primary (with the other being derivative), or whether both are different sides of the same moral coin.

## 12.7 Study questions

1. Very roughly, what is a virtue?
2. Who started ancient Greek ethics, and what was his main contribution? (12.1)
3. For Plato, was ethics based on sense experience or on reason? What role does "the Good" play in his thought?
4. Explain Plato's belief that the lower must depend on the higher?
5. What for Plato were the four main virtues?
6. What additions did St. Augustine and other Christian thinkers make to Plato's approach to virtue?
7. For Aristotle, what were the two basic reasons of virtue, and how did

8. Explain Aristotle's view that virtue is a mean between extremes—and give an example.
9. For Aristotle, what is happiness and what role does it play in ethics?
10. Give examples of virtues that you think are especially important.
11. Sketch how virtue is viewed by Ima Relativist, Ima Subjectivist, Ima Idealist, Ima Supernaturalist, Ima Intuitionist, Ima Utilitarian, and Ima Rossian. (12.3)
12. What virtues would be important for the golden-rule consistency view? What virtue would correspond to the golden rule? (12.4)
13. Explain three views about whether duty or virtue is primary. (12.5)

## 12.8 For further study

To solidify your understanding, do the EthCola exercise (see Preface) for "Ethics 12—Virtue."

Classic sources on virtue include Plato's *Republic* and Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. Elizabeth Anscombe's "Modern Moral Philosophy," Philippa Foot's *Virtues and Vices*, and Alasdair MacIntyre's *After Virtue* led to the rebirth of interest in virtue. Recent works include Rosalind Hursthouse's *On Virtue Ethics* and Michael Slote's *Morals from Motives*. The Bibliography at the end of the book has information on how to find these works.